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Executive Summary 
The Secretary of Energy on December 20, 2013 established the Secretary of Energy Advisory 
Board (SEAB) Task Force on Nuclear Nonproliferation (TFNN) and charged it to “advise the 
DOE on future areas of emphasis for its nuclear nonproliferation activities by addressing the 
following questions: 
1. What are the current and likely future challenges to nuclear nonproliferation?
2. What should DOE be doing to help the United States Government prepare to meet those
challenges?
3. What are DOE’s current areas of emphasis in nuclear nonproliferation?
4. In what ways should DOE’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts be modified and/or
expanded?
5. What obstacles stand in the way of making the recommended changes in DOE’s nuclear
nonproliferation activities, and how might they be overcome?”
In an Interim Report issued in July 2014, the Task Force addressed several timely and important 
issues that, in its view, merited prompt attention. DOE has made significant progress toward 
implementation of key recommendations in the Interim Report, including: preparation and 
issuance by NNSA of its first report to Congress on its current and planned efforts to address the 
threats of nuclear proliferation and terrorism; development of risk-informed priorities for nuclear 
nonproliferation; establishment of the DOE Nuclear Policy Council to serve as a mechanism for 
Department-wide consideration of cross-cutting nuclear issues; reorganizing the office of 
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation along the lines of “enduring missions”; and establishment of a 
Council of DOE Headquarters, Labs, Plants and Sites to coordinate nuclear nonproliferation 
strategy and planning, including (but not limited to) R&D. 
This Final Report explicitly addresses the five questions posed in the charge to the Task Force. 
1. What are the current and likely future challenges to nuclear nonproliferation? Current
and likely future challenges to nuclear nonproliferation occur in four interrelated categories: 
preventing additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons; preventing non-state actors 
from acquiring nuclear and radiological weapons; reducing the risks posed by existing nuclear 
arsenals; and maintaining and strengthening the international nonproliferation and nuclear 
security regime.  
The states currently or potentially most interested in acquiring nuclear weapons appear to be 
concentrated in the Middle East, but this has not always been so in the past and may not persist 
into the future. 
Non-state actors seeking nuclear weapons are far less able than states to produce the required 
nuclear materials, so they attempt to buy or steal those materials from states or from enterprises 
operating under the authority of states. For so long as there are vulnerable stocks of materials 
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suited to nuclear or radiological weapons and violent extremists bent on mass destruction, the 
threat of nuclear terrorism will be real.  
Existing nuclear arsenals pose not only the danger of their being used, but also that they might be 
bought or stolen by a state or non-state actor. These dangers currently are greatest in South Asia.  
At the heart of the international regime is the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. To the extent that 
the Treaty is seen as failing to prevent proliferation, failing to lead to progress in nuclear 
disarmament, or failing to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy, its overall credibility is 
undercut. United Nations resolutions, multilateral institutions, and voluntary associations focused 
on nonproliferation also face major challenges. 
2. What should DOE be doing to help the United States Government prepare to meet those
challenges? The response to this question is an integral part of the response to Question 4 (“In 
what ways should DOE’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts be modified and/or expanded?”). 
3. What are DOE’s current areas of emphasis in nuclear nonproliferation? DOE’s
nonproliferation programs have made and are making essential contributions to U.S. national 
security. Current activities fall predominantly into four key areas: materials security and 
counterterrorism; nonproliferation and arms control; research and development; and intelligence. 
These areas of activity are discussed in response to Question 3, and implicitly in response to 
Question 4. 
4. In what ways should DOE’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts be modified and/or
expanded? The Task Force offers a candidate “vision” of a world that sustained nonproliferation 
efforts by the U.S. and others might reasonably be expected to achieve in the intermediate term 
(e.g., 10-15 years); a proposed list of priorities for DOE efforts in support of that vision; and, 
consistent with the vision and priorities, a set of recommendations for modification and/or 
expansion of DOE efforts. 
Vision. Sustained nonproliferation efforts by the U.S. and others might reasonably be expected to 
achieve in the intermediate term (e.g., 10-15 years) a world in which: 
• The number of states with nuclear weapons has decreased (or at least not increased);
• All nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials are effectively and sustainably
secured against the full range of plausible threats (including cyber breaches), and other
steps have been taken to bring the probability of nuclear or radiological terrorism to the
lowest achievable level;
• The numbers of deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons have been reduced
substantially, and they are postured in ways that reduce the risks of their being used;
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• Measures that reduce both the demand for nuclear weapons and the supply of
technologies to proliferating states’ nuclear weapons programs have been put in place
worldwide;
• The risks of nuclear activities have been substantially reduced through expanded
transparency, verification, and multinational control;
• There is stronger global governance of nuclear activities; and
• Countries can enjoy the benefits of nuclear energy with decreased proliferation risks.
Priorities. In light of the foregoing vision, the Task Force believes that DOE’s nonproliferation 
efforts should be concentrated in the following areas: 
• Support U.S. Government efforts to formulate and implement nuclear nonproliferation
policies;
• Prevent nuclear and radiological terrorism;
• Halt illicit transfers of nuclear technology;
• Build the foundations for dealing with future challenges and opportunities;
• Provide intelligence to guide policy; and
• Reduce the proliferation risks of nuclear energy.
Recommendations. The Task Force offers a total of 17 specific  recommendations, and 
suggestions for how they might be implemented, in the following general areas: 
• Support U.S. Government efforts to formulate and implement nuclear nonproliferation
policies;
• Prevent nuclear and radiological terrorism;
• Halt illicit transfers of nuclear technology;
• Build the foundations for dealing with future nonproliferation challenges and
opportunities;
• Provide intelligence to guide policy;
• Manage the proliferation risks of nuclear energy;  and
• Enhance U.S. approaches to plutonium management and disposition.
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5. What obstacles stand in the way of making the recommended changes in DOE’s nuclear
nonproliferation activities, and how might they be overcome?  A variety of barriers could 
stand in the way of implementing the recommendations offered by the Task Force. The principal 
obstacles addressed in this report are the following: 
• Limited foreign willingness to cooperate;
• Limited resources – of both people and money;
• Need for improved DOE management;
• Need for intensified DOE engagement with other agencies;
• Limited understanding of the DOE program; and
• Absence of a disposition path for used fuel and high-level waste.
Many of the barriers to implementation of the Task Force recommendations are not subject to 
DOE’s sole control. Nevertheless, given the importance of the nonproliferation program, an 
aggressive effort to join with others to overcome the barriers is warranted. 
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Despite many successful U.S. efforts in nuclear nonproliferation, daunting challenges remain.  Some 
nations are pursuing nuclear weapons and others are expanding their nuclear arsenals; some stockpiles 
of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable materials remain dangerously insecure; U.S.-Russia 
cooperation on nuclear security has diminished; and an increasing number of terrorist organizations 
appear eager to obtain and use nuclear weapons against the U.S. and its allies and friends.  Longstanding 
challenges to U.S. nonproliferation efforts are being joined by new obstacles and emerging dangers at a 
time of declining resources.  This state of affairs demands fresh thinking about ways to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of nuclear nonproliferation activities within the Department of Energy and 
across the U.S. Government. 
The Secretary of Energy on December 20, 2013 established the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board 
(SEAB) Task Force on Nuclear Nonproliferation (TFNN).  The Task Force’s charge was to “advise the 
DOE on future areas of emphasis for its nuclear nonproliferation activities by addressing the following 
questions: 
1. What are the current and likely future challenges to nuclear nonproliferation? 
2. What should DOE be doing to help the United States Government prepare to meet those 
challenges? 
3. What are DOE’s current areas of emphasis in nuclear nonproliferation? 
4. In what ways should DOE’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts be modified and/or expanded? 
5. What obstacles stand in the way of making the recommended changes in DOE’s nuclear 
nonproliferation activities, and how might they be overcome?” 
 
The complete charge to the TFNN appears in Appendix A; task force membership appears in Appendix 
B; and an Interim Report, issued in July 2014, appears in Appendix C.  
The Interim Report addressed five timely and important matters that, in the view of the Task Force, 
merited prompt attention:  (i) setting objectives and priorities for DOE nuclear nonproliferation 
programs; (ii) improving DOE  nuclear policy integration, analysis, and advocacy; (iii) strengthening 
DOE relationships with field offices, national laboratories, and production facilities; (iv) continuing and 
revitalizing U.S.-Russian nuclear security and nonproliferation cooperation; and (v) developing and 
implementing an investment strategy for nuclear nonproliferation research and development. 
DOE has made significant progress toward implementation of key recommendations in the Interim 
Report, including: preparation and recent issuance by NNSA of its first strategic plan to address the 
threats of nuclear proliferation and terrorism;1 development of risk-informed priorities for nuclear 
nonproliferation; establishment of the DOE Nuclear Policy Council to serve as a mechanism for 
Department-wide consideration of cross-cutting nuclear issues; reorganizing the office of Defense 
1 NNSA, “Prevent, Counter, and Respond – A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats (FY2016-2020),” March 2015.  
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 Nuclear Nonproliferation along the lines of “enduring missions;” and establishment of a Council of 
DOE Headquarters, Labs, Plants and Sites to coordinate nuclear nonproliferation strategy and planning, 
including (but not limited to) R&D. 
This Final Report explicitly addresses each element of our charge: assessing the emerging threat 
landscape and what should be done to meet it, examining DOE’s current areas of emphasis and potential 
misalignment, recommending actionable improvements, and suggesting how to overcome obstacles to 
successful implementation.  Smart policy ideas will not be enough.  Improving U.S. nonproliferation 
efforts, particularly in an era of budget austerity, will also require better organizational structures and 
processes that can set and sustain priorities, leverage expertise, deploy resources more strategically, and 
enhance a whole-of-government approach.  Our goal is to recommend ways to improve DOE’s all-
around performance in nuclear nonproliferation that can stand the test of time midst a changing threat 
landscape.  
Summarized below are the TFNN’s responses to the five questions posed in the charge. 
I. What Are the Current and Likely Future Challenges to Nuclear 
Nonproliferation? 
Current and likely future challenges to nuclear nonproliferation can be divided into four interrelated 
categories: preventing additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons; preventing non-state actors 
from acquiring nuclear and radiological weapons; reducing the risks posed by existing nuclear arsenals; 
and maintaining and strengthening the international nonproliferation and nuclear security regime.  
Preventing Proliferation to Additional Countries.  In recent years, U.S. nonproliferation efforts have 
focused on India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, Libya, and Iraq.  The results have been mixed.  On the 
one hand, India and Pakistan now have substantial nuclear arsenals, North Korea has conducted three 
nuclear tests, and Iran has developed many of the capabilities essential to producing nuclear weapons.  
On the other hand, neither Libya nor Iraq now has a meaningful nuclear weapons program.  In the near 
term, North Korea and Iran continue to present the most pressing proliferation challenges that can 
realistically be addressed. 
North Korea has a nuclear arsenal of uncertain size and sophistication.  In the absence of successful 
efforts to curb its program, North Korea seems highly likely to expand its arsenal and to deploy nuclear 
weapons on ballistic missiles, and, eventually to be capable of striking the continental U.S.  In addition 
to the direct military threat to the U.S. and its allies in East Asia, expansion of the North Korean nuclear 
program: would increase pressure in South Korea and Japan to develop independent nuclear deterrents; 
could stimulate deployments of ballistic missile defenses by the U.S. and others, thereby diminishing 
prospects for future arms control agreements; and could increase Pyongyang’s willingness to sell or 




 Iran has gradually achieved substantial centrifuge capabilities to enrich uranium and has under 
construction a heavy water reactor that could produce significant amounts of plutonium.  Current 
negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (U.S., U.K., Russia, France, and China—plus Germany) might 
lead to an agreement imposing, for a decade or more, verifiable constraints on Iran’s ability to produce 
nuclear-weapons-usable materials quickly at declared facilities.  If the negotiations fail, however, Iran 
could resume and possibly accelerate programs that would enhance its nuclear weapons option. 
Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, or of the capability to produce them on short notice, would pose 
threats to peace and stability in the Middle East and to the international nonproliferation regime.  For 
example, a nuclear-capable Iran might pursue more aggressive regional policies, increasing tensions and 
the risks of conflicts in the region, and it might feel less constrained in its support for terrorism in the 
Middle East and beyond.  A nuclear-capable Iran would increase pressure on the governments of Egypt, 
Turkey, and Saudi Arabia to seek their own incipient or realized nuclear weapons.  And a nuclear-armed 
Iran would raise concerns about the effectiveness of nuclear security and command and control over its 
forces.  In light of these potentially serious consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran, it is conceivable that 
if the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 were to fail, the U.S. and/or Israel might launch a 
preventative attack against Iranian nuclear facilities. 
The states currently or potentially interested in acquiring nuclear weapons appear to be concentrated in 
East Asia and the Middle East.  Countries in other regions seem currently to lack either strong 
motivation to acquire nuclear weapons or the technological capabilities required to do so.  This has not 
always been so in the past, however, and might not persist into the future. 
Proliferation to Non-State Actors.  The al Qaeda attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. on 
September 11, 2001, exemplify and dramatize the willingness of terrorist organizations to carry out large 
scale, mass casualty operations.  If such groups were to gain control of nuclear weapons, they would be 
more likely than state actors to use them.  And if they were to use them, the magnitudes of the resulting 
death and destruction could dwarf those of 9/11.  Because non-state actors seeking nuclear weapons are 
far less able than states to produce the required nuclear materials, they have tried to buy or steal those 
materials from states or from enterprises operating under the legal authority of states.  To our 
knowledge, they have not yet been successful.  But so long as there are vulnerable stocks of nuclear 
materials and violent extremists bent on mass destruction, the threat of nuclear terrorism will persist. 
Significant risks of nuclear theft exist in a number of countries.  For example, Russia has the world’s 
largest nuclear stockpiles in the world’s largest number of buildings and bunkers, with security that still 
has some substantial weaknesses and in an environment that includes widespread corruption and insider 
theft.  Pakistan has the world’s most frightening combination of growing nuclear stockpiles and terrorist 
groups capable of infiltrating security organizations and attacking heavily defended targets.  Other 
countries have sensitive nuclear sites, such as reactors fueled with highly enriched uranium, with 
especially weak security in place. 
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 Risks of Existing Arsenals.  The relationships among nuclear deterrence, nuclear arms control, and 
nuclear proliferation are prominent elements of the international debate surrounding the nonproliferation 
regime.  Indeed, a significant portion of DOE’s nonproliferation activity is devoted to developing and 
implementing verification and monitoring approaches for current and possible future arms control 
agreements. 
It is in South Asia that existing nuclear arsenals are most likely to be used.  India and Pakistan share a 
border, have fought several wars, are coping with attacks by terrorist groups, and are expanding their 
already sizable nuclear arsenals.  Pakistan’s deployment of battlefield nuclear forces lowers the nuclear 
threshold from strategic to tactical, and increases the risk that terrorist groups might seize weapons 
stationed with front-line forces.  India’s development over time of mobile land-based missiles and 
submarine-launched missiles could stimulate further expansion of Chinese nuclear forces and 
complicate any effort to engage China in arms control negotiations. 
The International Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security Regime.  The international nonproliferation and 
nuclear security regime comprises four elements: a system of treaties (such as the NPT and the 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials); United Nations resolutions (such as UN 
Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires all member states to put in place a wide range of 
proliferation controls); multilateral institutions (such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the 
Conference on Disarmament); and voluntary associations (such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism). 
At the heart of the nonproliferation aspect of this regime lies the NPT, the legitimacy of which depends 
upon its perceived effectiveness.  To the extent that the NPT is seen as failing to prevent nuclear 
proliferation, failing to lead to progress in nuclear disarmament, or failing to promote peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy, its overall credibility is undercut.  In this regard: the absence of Israel as an NPT party 
weakens the validity of the Treaty in the eyes of other nations in the Middle East; an Iranian success in 
developing nuclear weapons under the guise of a civilian program might encourage others to do the 
same; progress toward nuclear disarmament is widely viewed as having stalled, as exemplified by 
failures to achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention or a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty, to bring into 
force the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or to negotiate further U.S.-Russia nuclear arms reductions; 
and international controls on nuclear exports, especially dual-use technologies and materials, are seen by 
some states as hampering their access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
The supply control aspect of the international regime also faces major challenges.  The scientific, 
technological, and industrial capacities relevant to the production of nuclear weapons no longer are 
concentrated in countries with advanced economies.  This is evidenced, for example, by India’s nuclear 
test in 1974, by the breadth of the Iraqi nuclear program that surfaced in the wake of the 1991 war in 
Iraq, by the nuclear black market network of Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan, and by North Korea’s nuclear test in 
2006.  As a result of the spread of nuclear-weapons-related capabilities, it is no longer sufficient for the 
advanced countries alone to adopt national export control systems and instruments of international 
cooperation (such as the Nuclear Supplies Group) to coordinate export policies.  Success in controlling 
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 and protecting nuclear technologies, equipment, and materials now requires the engagement of a much 
larger and more diverse group of nations.  In addition, it is likely that some currently emerging and 
future technologies will have important implications for anticipating and dealing with potential nuclear 
proliferators. 
Special challenges are posed by countries that have a wide range of the technologies and materials 
relevant to the production of nuclear weapons, but limited willingness to cooperate in the international 
nonproliferation and nuclear security regime.  As examples: North Korea appears willing to sell missile 
technology and perhaps nuclear technology to any country that wants to make such a purchase; 
Pakistan’s export controls remain very much in need of improvement; and there continues to be a 
substantial flow of technology through China to Iran and North Korea. 
Finally, the spread of civilian nuclear energy to additional countries must be accompanied by a spread of 
effective safeguards and security to minimize proliferation risks, and by credible fuel assurances and 
spent fuel storage arrangements to dissuade additional countries from pursuing their own national fuel 
cycle programs. 
II. What Should DOE Be Doing to Help the U.S. Government Prepare to Meet 
the Current and Likely Future Challenges to Nuclear Nonproliferation? 
 
To help the U.S. Government prepare to meet the current and likely future challenges to nuclear 
nonproliferation, DOE should concentrate its efforts in the following areas: 
• Support U.S. Government efforts to formulate and implement nuclear nonproliferation policies; 
• Prevent nuclear and radiological terrorism; 
• Halt illicit transfers of nuclear technology; 
• Build the foundations for dealing with future challenges and opportunities; 
• Provide intelligence to guide policy; and 
• Reduce the proliferation risks of nuclear energy. 
Each of these priority areas is discussed in detail as part of the TFNN’s response to the fourth question 
posed in its charge; viz., “In what ways should DOE’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts be modified 
and/or expanded?” 
III. What Are DOE’s Current Areas of Emphasis in Nuclear Nonproliferation? 
 
DOE’s nonproliferation programs have made and are making essential contributions to U.S. national 
security, and should be regarded, funded, and managed as critical investments in the security of the U.S., 
much in the way that DOE’s nuclear weapons programs are treated.  Current DOE nonproliferation 
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 activities fall predominantly into four key areas:  materials security and counterterrorism; 
nonproliferation and arms control; research and development; and intelligence. 
National Security and Counterterrorism.  Securing dangerous nuclear and radiological materials from 
theft and use by terrorists is a high priority.  This area of activity includes:  
• Cooperating on nuclear and radiological security with Russia, other states of the former Soviet 
Union, China, India, Pakistan, and other countries around the world; 
• Helping other countries to remove weapons-usable material from their territory and to 
consolidate any remaining material at a small number of well secured sites; 
• Assisting with converting research and medical reactors around the world to the use of fuels 
other than HEU; 
• Removing or securing dangerous radiological materials at sites in the U.S. and abroad; 
• Strengthening the nuclear security culture at sensitive facilities globally; 
• Helping to block nuclear smuggling by providing radiation detectors and training in their use at 
key border crossings and ports; and 
• Maintaining and enhancing capabilities for responding to nuclear and radiological emergencies 
and in nuclear forensics. 
Nonproliferation and Arms Control.  Given the technical expertise at its laboratories and the scale and 
breath of its nuclear security and nonproliferation program, DOE is unique in the technical, operational, 
and policy insights it can bring to interagency discussions of nuclear threat reduction and proliferation 
prevention.  DOE provides essential support for U.S. Government efforts to stem the spread of nuclear 
weapons, control the risks of existing stockpiles, implement current agreements, and lay the foundation 
for future agreements.  Included among these efforts are: 
• Providing the foundation for negotiating and implementing international agreements by 
developing verification technologies and procedures, having DOE experts serving on U.S. 
negotiating delegations, and providing crucial technical advice on matters ranging from 
modifying Iran’s Arak reactor to reduce its capacity for producing plutonium for weapons to 
disabling North Korea’s nuclear facilities; 
• Leading the effort to reduce the stocks of HEU and plutonium produced by the U.S. and Russia 
over decades of Cold War; 
• Blocking illicit procurements of nuclear and dual-use technologies by playing a central role in 
implementing U.S. export controls, helping other countries to put in place and implement 
suitable export controls, and working with other U.S. Government agencies to track illicit 
procurement networks and stop illicit transfers; 
• Strengthening the IAEA and other international organizations by developing advanced 
safeguards technologies, helping states to implement safeguards effectively, and training a new 
generation of safeguards experts. 
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 • Limiting the proliferation risks of nuclear energy by leading U.S. Government efforts to develop 
reactors and fuel cycles that reduce or eliminate the use of materials and technologies applicable 
to the production of nuclear weapons, and by constraining the spread of enrichment and 
reprocessing technologies, particularly by offering attractive alternatives; and 
• Addressing regional risks by working with other agencies in developing approaches to halting or 
mitigating current and potential regional conflicts, such as those in South Asia. 
Nonproliferation Research and Development.  Through its laboratories, DOE plays a central role in the 
development of technologies for detecting, monitoring, verifying, and responding to nuclear 
proliferation threats.  A few examples of the broad range of R&D activities currently underway are as 
follows: 
• Developing new capabilities to detect uranium enrichment, uranium processing, plutonium 
processing, and weaponization activities; 
• Developing new capabilities to detect special nuclear material, including in transport, and to 
improve the effectiveness of international safeguards; and 
• Conducting measurements on nuclear weapons and components to support development of new 
approaches to verifying possible future agreements calling for reductions in nuclear weapons and 
materials. 
Intelligence.  For decades, DOE has played a critical part in supporting intelligence assessments of 
foreign nuclear activities – including both those of states and of non-state actors – and it continues to do 
so.  Given the unique expertise resident in the DOE laboratories and facilities on topics ranging from 
nuclear weapon design to the technologies of plutonium and HEU production, DOE’s role remains 
crucially important.  Since 2006, DOE has launched and taken the lead on an important community-
wide initiative, the Nuclear Materials Information Program (NMIP), intended to provide information 
about and assess security for weapons-usable nuclear material worldwide. 
In recent years, new approaches have been established to manage and fund the DOE labs’ intelligence 
work, which includes work both for DOE and for other elements of the intelligence community.  There 
has been an increased emphasis on specialization, with weapons labs working on weapons design issues, 
material production sites working on materials production issues, and so on.  This appears to have had 
the unintended side effect of virtually eliminating integrated analysis, which combines an understanding 
of the technical, organizational, and political aspects of foreign nuclear programs, at the DOE labs.  
Such integrated analysis is essential to deep understanding of these foreign programs and their 




 IV. In What Ways Should DOE’s Nuclear Nonproliferation Efforts Be 
Modified and/or Expanded? 
 
Our response to the question of how DOE’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts should be modified and/or 
expanded comprises a candidate “vision” of a world that sustained nonproliferation efforts by the U.S. 
and others might reasonably be expected to achieve; a proposed list of priorities for DOE efforts in 
support of that vision; and, consistent with the vision and the priorities, a set of recommendations for 
modification and/or expansion of DOE efforts. 
Vision.  Sustained nonproliferation efforts by the United States and others might reasonably be expected 
to achieve in the intermediate term (e.g., 10-20 years) a world in which: 
• The number of states with nuclear weapons has decreased (or at least not increased); 
• All nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials are effectively and sustainably secured 
against the full range of plausible threats (including cyber breaches), and other steps have been 
taken to bring the probability of nuclear or radiological terrorism to the lowest achievable level; 
• The numbers of deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons have been reduced substantially, 
and they are postured in ways that reduce the risks of their being used; 
• Measures that reduce both the demand for nuclear weapons and the supply of technologies to 
proliferating states’ nuclear weapons programs have been put in place worldwide; 
• The risks of nuclear activities have been substantially reduced through expanded transparency, 
verification, and multinational control; 
• There is stronger global governance of nuclear activities; and 
• Countries can enjoy the benefits of nuclear energy with decreased proliferation risks. 
Priorities.  In light of the foregoing vision, we believe that DOE’s nonproliferation efforts should be 
concentrated in the following areas: 
• Support U.S. Government efforts to formulate and implement nuclear nonproliferation policies; 
• Prevent nuclear and radiological terrorism; 
• Halt illicit transfers of nuclear technology; 
• Build the foundations for dealing with future challenges and opportunities; 
• Provide intelligence to guide policy; and 
• Reduce the proliferation risks of nuclear energy. 
Recommendations.  DOE’s already strong nonproliferation efforts can be strengthened further through 
changes within DOE (including headquarters, laboratories, plants, and sites) and in DOE’s relationship 
with other U.S. Government agencies involved in nuclear nonproliferation.  Our interim report focused 
primarily (but not solely) on changes that might be made within DOE.  A number of the 




 Recent reviews, including the “Report of the Congressional Advisory Panel on the Governance of the 
Nuclear Security Enterprise” (i.e., the Augustine-Mies report), call for fundamental reforms of the way 
the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is run – including management of DOE’s main 
nuclear nonproliferation efforts.2  In a recent memorandum to the Secretary of Energy, the SEAB stated 
that it “strongly supports the Augustine-Mies Report.”3  A recent workforce survey placed NNSA near 
the bottom (228th of 315) among similarly sized units of federal agencies as a place of work.  Employee 
ratings for both DOE and NNSA in this survey have been declining sharply in recent years.4  These are 
clearly issues that require immediate attention, as it is highly unlikely that an unhappy, unmotivated 
workforce will conduct successful programs.  We believe that the reforms proposed by the Augustine-
Mies panel and others; the steps DOE has already been taking; the actions recommended in our interim 
report; and a nonproliferation program centered on a clearly articulated vision and set of priorities, could 
contribute significantly to addressing these problems. 
We note also that the overall budget for DOE’s nonproliferation programs has declined from over $2.2 
billion in FY2013 to $1.6 billion for FY2015, a reduction of 25 percent.  Some of this reduction reflects 
projects having been completed or efforts having been put on hold while DOE reviews its approach to 
them – most prominently the uranium-plutonium mixed oxide (MOX) project for disposition of excess 
weapons plutonium.  Yet, it appears to us that the need to counter current and likely future challenges to 
nonproliferation justifies increased, rather than reduced, investment in this area. 
In accordance with the charge to the Task Force, the recommendations in this report focus primarily on 
nonproliferation efforts that should be modified, reduced, or expanded, and not on current activities (no 
matter how important) that should be sustained at approximately current levels.  Hence, the fact that a 
particular program is not called out for discussion in this report does not mean that we do not believe it 
is important. 
1. Support U.S. Government efforts to formulate and implement nuclear 
nonproliferation policies. 
DOE provides technical, analytical, operational, and policy expertise in support of U.S. nuclear 
nonproliferation policymaking and implementation in general and with regard to nations of particular 
nonproliferation concern (such as Iran and North Korea).  In our interim report, we offered 
recommendations aimed at increasing the effectiveness of that support, including specific measures for 
setting objectives and priorities for nonproliferation efforts; for improving nuclear policy analysis, 
integration, and advocacy; and for strengthening relationships between DOE headquarters, the field 
2 Congressional Panel, A New Foundation for the Nuclear Enterprise: Report of the Congressional Advisory Panel on the 
Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise (2014). 
3 Memorandum to the Secretary of Energy from John Deutch, Chair of SEAB, “SEAB comments on the Report of the 
Congress and Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise,” February 17, 2015. 
4 Partnership for Public Service and Deloitte, The Best Places to Work in the Federal Government: 2014 Rankings 
(Washington, D.C.: Partnership for Public Service, 2014), http://bestplacestowork.org/BPTW/. 
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 offices, the national labs, and the production facilities.  We are pleased to note that substantial progress 
is being made in these areas, and we recommend that the following further steps be taken: 
Recommendation 1-A:  Ensure the effectiveness of an organizational structure that provides for  
integration within DOE of all aspects of nuclear policy (including nuclear weapons, nuclear 
nonproliferation, nuclear energy, nuclear waste, emergency response, and nuclear counter-terrorism). 
 
DOE recently established a new Nuclear Policy Council for this purpose, with a small staff reporting 
directly to the Secretary.  We encourage the Secretary to assess the effectiveness of the Council after six 
months, and in particular to review whether the small initial staff attached to the Council is sufficient to 
innovate and lead the crosscutting policy analyses and initiatives. 
Recommendation 1-B:  Improve mechanisms for integrating scientific and technical expertise 
(especially that which resides in the national labs) into nuclear policymaking. 
 
Here, too, DOE is already taking important action, including creation of a new group including leaders 
of the nonproliferation effort at headquarters and at the laboratories and facilities.  In addition to 
facilitating greater engagement of the scientific and technical experts at DOE headquarters, field offices, 
national labs, and production facilities, this new group should serve to strengthen relationships among 
these elements of the Department.   
There remains a need for additional steps to bring the voices of technical experts more fully into the 
policymaking process, including: 
• Seeking DOE involvement at all levels in the interagency policy process on nonproliferation and 
nuclear security matters; 
• Ensuring that DOE’s representatives in interagency processes are supported by the strong 
technical expertise available in the DOE laboratories and are able to bring those insights to bear 
on the subjects at hand; 
• Reducing the bureaucratic barriers to laboratory and facility personnel coming to headquarters 
for stints of 2-3 years (and strengthening the incentives for them to do so); 
• Convincing program managers to bring laboratory and facility personnel into their policy 
deliberations, thereby making fuller use of their perspectives and expertise; and   
• Instituting regular mechanisms for providing technical advice to DOE’s nonproliferation policy 
leadership. 
Recommendation 1-C:  Intensify efforts to anticipate and prepare for evolving and possible future 
threats to nuclear nonproliferation. 




 Cyber methods might be used for purposes such as gaining access to information about nuclear weapons 
or sensitive nuclear technologies, undermining security and facilitating theft of nuclear materials, 
sabotaging nuclear facilities, defeating some aspects of IAEA safeguards, or even creating uncertainties 
about nuclear command and control. 
The number of independent and quasi-independent terrorist organizations has grown.  The United States 
and its allies now face many groups in many countries.  Assessments of the danger of terrorism using 
nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons must seek to track and analyze all available 
indicators of both capabilities and intentions of a wide range of groups. 
2. Prevent nuclear and radiological terrorism. 
The most important measures to prevent nuclear and radiological terrorism are ensuring that all nuclear 
weapons and weapons-usable materials (including those under control of the U.S.) are effectively and 
sustainably secured against the full range of plausible threats and that states take action to provide 
appropriate security for their radiological materials and major nuclear facilities. 
DOE’s contributions to nuclear security worldwide have been and continue to be admirable.  The nature 
of nuclear security effort has been shifting from a period of U.S. financing of large-scale equipment 
installations to a period in which other countries will be expected to do more themselves, and the goal of 
DOE programs will focus increasingly on convincing other countries to act and offering best practices in 
how to do so.  Savings from this transition may help to offset increased investment in other areas of 
nuclear security.  To the extent that funds can be made available for new or expanded initiatives in 
nuclear security, we offer the following recommendations. 
Recommendation 2-A:  Expand efforts to build a global nuclear materials security system of 
effective nuclear security norms, standards, and best practices worldwide. 
DOE, working with the State Department, the IAEA and other donor states, should expand its efforts to 
ensure that all countries where nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials exist protect them 
effectively (though the top priorities should remain on South Asia and Russia).  DOE could redeploy 
some of the personnel and resources it had planned to devote to nuclear security in Russia to working 
with the rest of the U.S. Government on efforts to build this global architecture and to get effective 
nuclear security practices in place around the world. 
This will require the creation of a stronger global nuclear security architecture – an ambitious objective 
being pursued internationally in part through the Nuclear Security Summit process.  DOE, with its 
unique technical expertise on nuclear security, should play a leadership role within the U.S. interagency 
process in shaping and advocating for a global system of norms, standards and best practices, and assist 




 DOE and the rest of the U.S. Government should work to build a global nuclear materials security 
system in which: 
• All nuclear materials are covered by the system, including military and other non-civilian 
materials. 
• States adhere to a common set of international norms and best practices, including: 
o All nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials – or nuclear facilities whose sabotage 
could cause a major catastrophe – are protected against a set of threats that includes the 
full spectrum of plausible adversary capabilities. 
o All nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials have accounting and control systems 
capable of detecting any significant theft. 
o All operators managing such items or facilities are subject to regular, in-depth inspection, 
peer review, and realistic testing to ensure that their security and accounting systems 
really are effective. 
o All operators managing such items or facilities have programs in place to assess and 
improve their staff’s security culture – their focus on achieving and sustaining effective 
protection. 
• States take steps to demonstrate to others – both domestically and internationally – that they do 
indeed have effective nuclear security measures in place for these dangerous stockpiles, while 
protecting sensitive information.  International peer review is a particularly effective approach to 
increasing such assurance of the effectiveness of nuclear security. 
• Effective training and certification programs are in place to ensure that all individuals with 
important nuclear security roles are demonstrably competent to do their jobs.   
• Risks are minimized over time by countries reducing their stocks of nuclear weapons and 
weapons-usable materials and the number of locations at which they are kept to the minimum 
necessary for their ongoing military and civilian needs, and by eliminating any sites whose 
continuing benefits are outweighed by their costs and risks. 
One area of nuclear security in which DOE innovation and leadership would be particularly valuable 
would be in establishing agreed international norms and practices for the security of military nuclear 
materials (material designated for military uses, or in military custody, including nuclear weapons 
themselves).   
Recommendation 2-B:  Seek to rebuild nuclear security cooperation with Russia, and to strengthen 
bilateral nuclear security cooperation with other key states. 
At the end of 2014, Russia ended most U.S.-Russian joint work on nuclear security in Russia.  Despite 
the dramatic improvements in nuclear security in Russia that DOE programs have helped accomplish 
over the past 20 years, however, there are still important weaknesses that should be addressed, in the 
interests of U.S., Russian, and world security. 
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 DOE should continue cooperation in those areas Russia has allowed to continue, including working with 
the Russian regulatory agency, Rostekhnadzor, and with the modest number of facilities or institutions 
where Russia has not cut off cooperation.  DOE’s nuclear security relationship with China has long 
focused primarily on in-depth workshops and best practice exchanges on particular aspects of nuclear 
security – from insider protection to nuclear material accounting – without many visits to major Chinese 
nuclear facilities.  It may well be possible to have a similar ongoing discussion with Russia.   
Maintaining the dialogue among technical experts, to the extent possible, is important even if the United 
States will no longer be involved in major technical improvements at Russian nuclear facilities.  At the 
same time, working with the rest of the U.S. Government, DOE should seek to develop and propose 
approaches to nuclear security cooperation that appear to put both countries in equal roles and may be 
more attractive to Russia.  Such approaches are not likely to be accepted in the current political 
environment.  But if the parties make progress in resolving the crisis in Ukraine, such steps should be an 
early focus of efforts to rebuild the nuclear relationship. 
In cooperation with the rest of the U.S. Government, DOE should also review steps that can be taken to 
mitigate the resulting risks to U.S. security if no significant cooperation with Russia continues and, as a 
result, the security of Russian nuclear materials improves more slowly than would otherwise be the case.  
These might include, for example, expanded work with foreign countries to help them establish police or 
intelligence teams targeted on addressing nuclear smuggling and providing mobile radiation detection 
equipment where deemed needed. 
DOE should also seek to strengthen nuclear security cooperation with other states with significant stocks 
of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials.  In Pakistan, DOE and other parts of the U.S. 
Government should cooperate to the extent feasible on improving nuclear security and should seek to 
convince the Pakistani government to manage its nuclear arsenal and complex in ways that minimize 
risks of nuclear theft – including by sharing U.S. experiences with the dangers of the battlefield nuclear 
weapons Pakistan is now pursuing.  In India, DOE should seek to expand the very limited nuclear 
security cooperation that India as accepted to date, including cooperation with Indian regulators and 
with the Central Industrial Security Force.  In China, as the nuclear security Center of Excellence (a 
facility for education and training in nuclear security, funded jointly by the U.S. and China) moves 
toward completion, there may be opportunities to expand work on strengthening regulations (including 
working with China to establish an appropriate national-level design basis threat regulation) and on 
security culture – including, potentially, cooperation that includes some visits to Chinese nuclear 
facilities.  DOE should explore the possibility of expanding the successful trilateral best practice 
exchanges with Russia and the United Kingdom to include all of the P5 countries – and ultimately, 
countries such as India and Pakistan as well.  DOE should also seek to expand it work with non-nuclear-




 Recommendation 2-C:  Expand the effort to limit the number of places in the world where nuclear 
weapons and weapons-usable material exist, including both HEU and plutonium, both civilian and 
military materials. 
DOE has done excellent work in seeking to reduce the civilian use of HEU, helping to convert research 
and isotope production reactors and remove HEU from sites around the world.  These efforts should 
continue, but they should be complemented by broader approaches: 
• DOE should work with countries with weapons-usable nuclear materials, including 
nuclear weapon stockpiles, to convince them to make every effort to consolidate their 
nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials to the minimum number of 
locations necessary;  
• DOE and the rest of the U.S. Government should work to limit the spread of reprocessing 
to additional countries and locations, to ensure that all operations with separated 
plutonium are protected against the full spectrum of plausible adversary threats, to end 
the growth of plutonium stocks, and to begin reducing these stocks over time; and   
• In addition to continuing work on converting HEU-fueled reactors to LEU, DOE should 
establish an effort to offer incentives and assistance to shut down research reactors that 
are no longer needed. 
Recommendation 2-D:  Intensify the focus on identifying and reducing cyber vulnerabilities in 
nuclear systems worldwide. 
The United States, including DOE, has been in the forefront in recognizing the potential dangers cyber 
vulnerabilities could pose in a variety of areas.  Nevertheless, there is more to be done in the United 
States, and in many other countries the road still to be traveled is even longer.  DOE should strengthen 
coordination between its physical security and cyber security offices, and should work with appropriate 
international organizations to develop best practices for addressing cyber vulnerabilities in nuclear 
systems globally. 
3. Halt illicit transfers of nuclear technology. 
All of the states that have sought nuclear weapons in recent decades have established illicit procurement 
networks to get the technologies they need.  DOE plays a key role in stopping this dangerous trade, 
supporting domestic U.S. controls, providing information for investigations and interdictions, and 
helping countries around the world strengthen their own controls. 
Recommendation 3-A:  Expand efforts to ensure that countries put in place effective export 




 DOE’s efforts to strengthen export controls and enforcement around the world have made important 
progress but face major challenges.  Yet, for many countries, effective export controls are a low priority.  
In a globalized world, some sensitive technologies could be manufactured anywhere a precision 
computer-aided manufacturing machine could be installed.  That is why UN Security Council 
Resolution 1540 legally obligated all countries to put effective controls in place – an effort that is still 
very much in progress.  DOE’s effort to help countries strengthen export controls has been very 
successful, but could do more, more effectively, with a modest increase in funding and personnel.  We 
heard from both DOE and State Department personnel about important meetings that DOE experts were 
unable to attend, engagements delayed, and insufficient investment in training the next generation of 
experts, all arising from the limited funds and federal employees available for this effort.  A few 
millions of dollars in additional funds each year (which could be directed from other programs), along 
with appropriate federal personnel, could alleviate these issues and expand the number of countries for 
which assistance could be provided. 
Similarly, an increase in the resources focused on tracking black-market procurement networks over 
time and supporting interdiction and enforcement efforts could help the U.S. Government stay ahead of 
these ever-evolving threats.  This would combine efforts of nonproliferation and intelligence staff at 
headquarters and at the laboratories.  DOE’s expertise is critical to understanding which technologies are 
most important and feasible to restrict and how these networks are functioning. 
4. Build the foundations for dealing with future nonproliferation 
challenges and opportunities. 
To provide the capabilities needed to deal with future nonproliferation challenges and opportunities, 
DOE must anticipate emerging and future technologies having potential implications for 
nonproliferation and arms control; develop new detection and monitoring technologies and approaches 
in the R&D program; work with other countries to develop appropriate verification and implementation 
procedures and approaches (as in the warhead and fissile material transparency program, for example); 
and develop and maintain the people and facilities that will be needed to cope with future efforts. 
Recommendation 4-A:  Work with other relevant USG agencies to design and launch a 
comprehensive national research and development program on technologies and procedures for 
verifying future nuclear arms reductions. 
 
The administration’s Nuclear Posture Review called for a “comprehensive national research and 
development program” to support progress on arms reductions, including “expanded work on 
verification technologies and the development of transparency measures.”  Despite ongoing work in a 
number of areas, no such comprehensive national R&D program yet exists.  Such a program could be 
built by expanding and integrating existing programs.  The State Department has launched a new 
initiative on international cooperation on disarmament verification, in cooperation with the non-
21 
 
 government Nuclear Threat Initiative, which would be one important piece of such a comprehensive 
program.  The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is pursuing important work in this area.  But 
given DOE’s management of the nuclear weapons complex and the expertise of the DOE labs, DOE is 
in a unique position to lead a comprehensive national program, as well as international R&D efforts 
focused on verification. 
The goal of such an initiative should be to develop a comprehensive suite of verification and 
transparency tools to support potential future nuclear arms agreements.  Priorities should include 
techniques to confirm warhead dismantlement without revealing classified information; approaches to 
inspecting warhead and fissile material storage locations; concepts for “nuclear archaeology” 
(confirming past production from current indicators) for additional types of nuclear facilities; and 
approaches to assessing the full suite of data available to judge whether declarations of stockpiles are 
accurate and complete.  An appropriately sized effort would likely cost several tens of millions of 
dollars a year.   
Recommendation 4-B:  Intensify the focus of nonproliferation R&D on high-risk, high-reward 
innovations. 
This is another area in which DOE has already taken important positive steps, including shifting its 
nonproliferation R&D programs toward a smaller number of larger-scale efforts, with more integration 
of laboratory perspectives in their design.  We have heard concerns, however, that it may still be 
difficult for high-risk, “out of the box” ideas to get funded.  DOE should consider setting aside a modest 
portion of the available nonproliferation R&D funds for competitively awarded grants for high-risk, 
high-reward ideas.5 
Recommendation 4-C:  Invest in the next generation of nuclear nonproliferation professionals. 
Many of the nation’s best nuclear experts will be retiring in the next decade.  Recruiting, training, and 
retaining the next generation are urgent tasks.  Congress and DOE should work together to make it 
easier to hire new federal employees at DOE; to make work at the national laboratories attractive; to 
provide the funding needed for younger people to work with senior experts, getting the experience they 
need to step into their shoes; to stimulate development of graduate education programs tailored to meet 
the needs of the laboratories; to expand recruitment programs such as NNSA’s graduate fellowship 
program; and to improve employee morale. 
5. Provide intelligence to guide policy. 
The intelligence programs at DOE and its laboratories are critically important.  Experts at DOE’s 
laboratories offer unsurpassed insights on foreign nuclear weapons and nuclear technologies.  Yet 
5 In a recent report, SEAB similarly called for an investment in high-risk, high-reward R&D to advance the cleanup of DOE’s 
legacy weapons sites.  SEAB, Report on the Task Force on Technology Development for Environmental Management (2014). 
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 DOE’s capabilities for conducting broad, integrated analyses to develop a comprehensive picture of a 
nation’s nuclear programs have decayed over time. 
Recommendation 5-A:  Rebuild DOE’s capabilities for conducting broad, integrated analyses of 
nuclear programs. 
Broad, integrated analysis designed to develop a complete picture of a country’s program, incorporating 
both political and technical aspects and drawing on a wide range of sources, is critically important.  
Only by understanding incentives, organizations, and technical capabilities can analysts make informed 
judgments about where a country’s nuclear program may be heading next.  Centers such as Lawrence 
Livermore’s Z Division, for example, once provided unparalleled insights into foreign nuclear weapons 
programs based on such an in-depth integration of information on all aspects of proliferating states’ 
programs.  Today, the laboratories focus largely on their own core areas of expertise, rather than on such 
integrated analysis.  In addition, substantial portions of funding have been shifted from the laboratories 
to headquarters personnel and Washington-area firms, further weakening the lab effort.  DOE should 
undertake a targeted campaign to rebuild integrated all-source analysis of foreign nuclear weapons 
efforts at the laboratories over the next few years. 
At the same time DOE should expand its efforts to look beyond the horizon – at the countries that may 
conceivably pursue nuclear weapons in the future, at new technologies that make it easier for states or 
groups to acquire nuclear weapons, at firms that may be developing the ability to supply sensitive 
technologies but may not yet have effective export compliance programs in place, and more. 
Recommendation 5-B:  Strengthen – and share – intelligence on nuclear and radiological 
terrorism threats. 
DOE has played a leading role in recent years in intelligence on nuclear terrorism, nuclear security, and 
nuclear smuggling, including taking the lead in the important multi-agency Nuclear Materials 
Information Program (NMIP), which is an effort to assess security for nuclear weapons and materials 
around the world.  DOE should work with other agencies to strengthen current efforts to track down and 
resolve past leads on terrorist nuclear and radiological activities and nuclear smuggling; to more fully 
understand the potential for today’s highest-capability terrorist groups to pursue nuclear or radiological 
terrorism; and to proactively explore nuclear black markets, including through expanded use of stings 
and related operations. 
There is a need to share key information with other countries.  DOE should work with other agencies to 
develop an in-depth analysis of everything the U.S. Government knows about the risk, at several levels 
of classification – one only for use within the U.S. Government, one that could be shared with countries 
such as Britain and France with whom the United States has restricted data sharing agreements, one that 
could be shared confidentially with a broader set of countries, and one that could be publicly released. 
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 6. Manage the proliferation risks of nuclear energy. 
A number of countries are building or planning their first nuclear power plants.  DOE and its 
laboratories are the repositories of most of the U.S. Government’s expertise on nuclear energy, giving 
them a critical role to play in reducing the proliferation risks a nuclear expansion could pose.  Although 
implementation of Recommendation 1-A (Formalize an organizational structure that will ensure 
integration within DOE of all aspects of nuclear policy, including nuclear weapons, nuclear 
nonproliferation, nuclear energy, and nuclear waste) would contribute substantially to DOE’s ability to 
recognize and reduce the proliferation risks associated with nuclear energy, there are additional steps 
that should be taken.  
Recommendation 6-A:  DOE should promote and participate in an interagency effort to support 
U.S. commercial involvement with civilian nuclear activities around the world. 
New reactor construction in the U.S. is unlikely to continue after the current five plants are completed, 
given the low price of natural gas, the absence of growth in electricity markets, and the high capital costs 
of nuclear plants.  Some countries in Europe are committed to new construction, but others have rejected 
nuclear energy and are prematurely closing plants.  At the same time, there are aggressive construction 
programs in China, Russia, South Korea, and India.  Russia is already a formidable international vendor 
and not doubt China will become a major exporter over time.  Many of the new entrant countries are in 
Asia or the Middle East.  In these circumstances the center of gravity in the use of civilian technology 
will move from the U.S. and Europe to Russia and Asia.  The capacity for the United States to influence 
the rules of the road on safeguards, security, and safety would be likely to diminish in a world in which 
the United States ceased to be a major player in commercial markets.  An accident at a civilian nuclear 
facility anywhere in the world would have negative implications for nuclear power programs in the U.S. 
and elsewhere.  There is therefore both an economic and a national security interest in seeking to 
preserve U.S. influence in the commercial nuclear world by encouraging and assisting the efforts of 
U.S.-based vendors of reactors, fuel, equipment, and services.  DOE should take steps such as working 
with the private sector to expand nuclear technology training programs for potential newcomer 
countries; working with the Department of Commerce to strengthen their approach to formal and 
informal advocacy of U.S. nuclear firms; working with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to 
strengthen the Commission’s outreach to potential newcomer countries; and seeking to build support in 
Congress for continuing the Export-Import Bank, whose financing has been important in recent nuclear 
negotiations.6  DOE should also seek to build international support for sensible “rules of the road” on 
safety, security, and nonproliferation, through bilateral cooperation, initiatives such as the International 




                                                          
 Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation, and support for non-government initiatives such as the 
recent agreement on a code of conduct for nuclear exports.7   
Recommendation 6-B:  Accelerate and expand efforts to build an International Framework for 
Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC) that would strengthen incentives for nations to enjoy the benefits 
of nuclear energy without acquiring enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. 
In the context of IFNEC, DOE should continue to develop and support international options for nuclear 
fuel supplies and waste management that would serve as reliable, affordable, attractive alternatives to 
acquiring and operating national enrichment and/or reprocessing facilities.  Examples of promising 
alternatives are fuel-leasing arrangements, an IAEA fuel bank, and U.S. take-back of limited quantities 
of spent fuel when doing so would contribute significantly to U.S. national security.  DOE should 
expand its cooperation with countries to help them overcome the political and regulatory obstacles to 
expanding dry cask storage.  When DOE considers pursuing joint R&D with non-nuclear-weapon states 
on technologies relating to enrichment or reprocessing, it should carry out a thorough nonproliferation 
assessment of the proposed project as part of the decision on whether or not to proceed. 
7. Enhance U.S. approaches to plutonium management and disposition. 
Recommendation 7-A:  Undertake an expanded effort to improve management of plutonium 
separation and stocks around the world. 
Countries pursuing a once-through fuel cycle and countries pursuing reprocessing of spent fuel are not 
likely to agree soon on which fuel cycle is more desirable.  It is indisputable, however, that the spread of 
reprocessing, which provides more widespread access to separated plutonium, carries substantial 
proliferation and nuclear security risks.  And it is important to manage the reprocessing activities and the 
stocks of separated plutonium that already exist safely and securely, and to reduce these stocks over 
time. 
DOE should work with other countries with excess plutonium stocks to develop safe, secure, and cost-
effective approaches to disposition of this material, which could either supplement or substitute for 
efforts to use this material in mixed oxide (MOX) fuel.  This could include joint R&D efforts on 
plutonium disposition alternatives. 
Recommendation 7-B:  DOE should explore alternatives to the U.S. MOX program for plutonium 
disposition.  
 
7 See the “Nuclear Power Plant and Reactor Exports’ Principles of Conduct,” http://nuclearprinciples.org/.  These principles 




                                                          
 The more than $30 billion projected cost of the U.S. MOX program provides sufficient incentive to 
explore alternative approaches to plutonium disposition that would be less costly and might overcome 
any domestic, diplomatic, or technological barriers to change. 
Alternatives worthy of consideration include long-term storage, as well as immobilization or other 
processing for disposal in a future nuclear waste repository or in deep boreholes.  As suggested above, 
DOE should pursue international cooperation on such alternatives as appropriate.  All of these 
alternatives have their own uncertainties and issues. 
V. What Obstacles Stand in the Way of Making the Recommended Changes 
in DOE’s Nuclear Nonproliferation Activities, and How Might They Be 
Overcome? 
A variety of barriers could stand in the way of implementation of the various recommendations offered 
in this report.  The principal obstacles and means by which they might be overcome include the 
following: 
Limited foreign willingness to cooperate.  The successful pursuit of U.S. nonproliferation objectives 
depends inherently on the cooperation of foreign governments.  For example, foreign government 
engagement and agreement is necessary to establish an enhanced global nuclear security system, to build 
nuclear security cooperation on a bilateral basis with Russia and other countries, to limit the number of 
places in which weapons-usable nuclear materials exist, to reduce cyber vulnerabilities worldwide, to 
expand the effectiveness of export controls, and to strengthen incentives for nations to enjoy the benefits 
of nuclear energy without acquiring enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. 
Achieving foreign engagement would require hard work by DOE and other government agencies to 
articulate and advance the understanding of the common interest of the world community in the pursuit 
of these activities.  This is not an obstacle that DOE can overcome on its own, but it is critical for the 
success of DOE’s non-proliferation efforts. 
Limited resources – both people and money.  Nearly all of our recommendations have implications for 
budget and staffing.  We recognize that in a time of budget stringency there are necessary constraints on 
the funds that can be applied in pursuit of the nonproliferation mission.  Some of our recommendations 
could be effectively pursued by the reallocation of funds that are part of the current budget; others might 
require additional budgetary support.   
It is our understanding that in recent years Congress also has reduced by about 25 percent the number of 
staff that may be employed as part of the DOE nonproliferation program.  Although we have had 
occasion to undertake only a limited examination of the matter, our impression is that the FTE constraint 




The response to this obstacle is both to be more effective in making the case for the importance of 
DOE’s nonproliferation activities to Congress and others (discussed below) and in assuring that the 
existing resources are deployed effectively. 
Need for improved DOE management.  Both the Augustine-Mies report and a recent report of the 
National Research Council focus on issues related to the management of NNSA and the NNSA 
laboratories.8  As noted in these reports, in a memorandum from SEAB to the Secretary of Energy, and 
earlier in this report, these matters require immediate attention.   
Need for intensified DOE engagement with other agencies.  DOE through its laboratories brings great 
technical expertise to all aspects of the U.S. Government’s approach to nonproliferation activities.  Most 
of our recommendations require extensive DOE interaction and cooperation with other U.S. Government 
agencies at all levels.  These include the formulation and implementation of nonproliferation policies, 
expanded efforts to build a global nuclear materials security system, building effective bilateral nuclear 
security cooperation, limiting the number of places at which weapons-usable materials exist, addressing 
cyber vulnerabilities worldwide, assuring effective export controls, launching a comprehensive national 
research and development program, strengthening the sharing of intelligence on nuclear and radiological 
terrorism, advancing the interagency efforts to promote U.S. commercial involvement with civilian 
nuclear activities, and accelerating and expanding efforts to build an International Framework for 
Nuclear Energy Cooperation. In light of the importance of these activities, DOE personnel should be 
engaged to the greatest extent possible in the interagency processes in which they are formulated and 
implemented. 
Limited understanding of the DOE program.  It is apparent to the Task Force that the scope, value, and 
effectiveness of DOE’s nonproliferation activities are not fully understood and appreciated in the 
Congress, in OMB, and elsewhere in government.  As a result of lack of understanding, the overall 
program may be subject to unnecessary and inappropriate constraints. 
The response to this obstacle involves recognizing the problem and pursuing aggressive efforts to inform 
others of the range of activities and of the achievements.  We understand that the Office of Defense 
Nuclear Nonproliferation has undertaken some efforts to enhance its “public relations” in this respect.  
We very much encourage the continuation and expansion of that effort. 
Absence of a disposition path for used fuel and high-level waste.  For reasons entirely separate from 
nonproliferation considerations, there is a need for the U.S. to develop a disposal pathway for the 
nation’s used nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.  But, as an ancillary benefit, 
nonproliferation objectives would be better served if the U.S. was in a position to accept spent fuel and 
separated plutonium from abroad for disposal in the U.S.  The removal of this material from other 
countries would obviously serve to make it unavailable for use for weapons purposes.  Indeed, the 
capacity to offer this service could advance U.S. civilian commercial engagement; we understand that 
8 National Research Council, Aligning the Governance Structure of the NNSA Laboratories to Meet 21st Century National 
Security Challenges (2015). 
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 the success of the Russian reactor vendor arises in part for its capacity to offer a “package deal” in 
which it will both provide fresh fuel and then take it back for disposition in Russia, thereby enabling the 
recipient country to avoid expensive fuel-cycle related activities.  Moreover, the creation of a disposal 
path for spent fuel and high-level waste would provide an option for disposition of U.S. separated 
plutonium. 
We recognize that the response to this obstacle necessarily involves Congressional engagement and is 
not solely within DOE’s control.  Nonproliferation considerations reinforce the importance of 









* * * 
Implementation of our recommendations would require DOE to seek to overcome numerous obstacles, 
many of which are not subject to its sole control.  Nonetheless, given the importance of the 
nonproliferation program, we believe that an aggressive effort to join with others to overcome the 
obstacles is warranted. 
28 
 
The Secretary of Energy 
Washington, DC 20585 
December 20, 2013 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CO-CHAIRS 
SECRETARY OF ENERGY ADVISORY BOARD 
FROM: ERNEST J. MONIZ ~ 
SUBJECT: Establishing a Task Force on Nuclear Nonproliferation 
I request that you form a Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (SEAB) Task Force on 
Nuclear Nonproliferation. The Task Force will comprise SEAB members and individuals 
with expertise and experience in the technologies, institutions, and policy issues 
associated with curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the materials, 
technologies, and expertise associated with them. The Task Force should inform itself on 
the range of future nuclear proliferation threats and consult with officials in other 
agencies. 
Purpose of the Task Force: The SEAB Task Force on Nuclear Nonproliferation will 
advise the DOE on future areas of emphasis for its nuclear nonproliferation activities by 
addressing the following questions: 
• What are the current and likely future challenges to nuclear nonproliferation? 
• What should DOE be doing to help the United States Government prepare to meet 
those challenges? 
• What are DO E' s current areas of emphasis in nuclear nonproliferation? 
• In what ways should DOE' s nuclear nonproliferation efforts be modified and/or 
expanded? 
• What obstacles stand in the way of making the recommended changes in DO E' s 
nuclear nonproliferation activities, and how might they be overcome? 
Designated Federal Official: Karen Gibson, Director, Office of Secretarial Boards and 
Councils 
Schedule: The Task Force will provide a brief written report and make a presentation to 
SEAB in July 2014. The Task Force will submit a written report and make a presentation 
to SEAB and the public at SEAB's sixth meeting, expected in December 2014. 
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Executive Summary 
The SEAB Task Force on Nuclear Nonproliferation (TFNN) was established by the Secretary of Energy 
on December 20, 2013 to “advise the Department of Energy (DOE) on future areas of emphasis for 
its nuclear nonproliferation activities by addressing the following questions: 
1. What are the current and likely future challenges to nuclear nonproliferation?
2. What should DOE be doing to help the United States Government (USG) prepare to meet
those challenges?
3. What are DOE’s current areas of emphasis in nuclear nonproliferation?
4. In what ways should DOE’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts be modified and/or expanded?
5. What obstacles stand in the way of making the recommended changes in DOE’s nuclear
nonproliferation activities, and how might they be overcome?”1
This interim report of the Task Force sets forth its findings and recommendations to date in five 
timely and important areas: (I) Setting Objectives and Priorities for DOE Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Programs; (II) Improving DOE Nuclear Policy Integration, Analysis, and Advocacy; (III) Strengthening 
DOE Relationships with Field Offices, National Laboratories, and Production Facilities; (IV) 
Continuing and Revitalizing U.S.-Russian Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation Cooperation; and (V) 
Developing and Implementing an Investment Strategy for Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and 
Development.  (A more complete report is to be submitted at the end of 2014.) 
The gist of the findings and recommendations to date in each area appears below. These 
recommendations are mutually reinforcing.  
In addressing the problem of nuclear proliferation, it must be recognized that despite substantial 
recent progress, there are nations pursuing nuclear weapons, there remain nuclear stockpiles that 
are dangerously insecure, and there are terrorists eager to acquire and use nuclear weapons. 
Urgent actions are needed to meet these continuing threats. 
1 In keeping with our charge, we interpret nuclear “nonproliferation” to include the full set of U.S. efforts to 
prevent additional states or substate groups from acquiring nuclear weapons and the technologies and materials 
needed to make them, including efforts that some refer to as counterproliferation, weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) counter-terrorism, or nuclear security.  While most of DOE’s nuclear nonproliferation activities are 
implemented by the semi-autonomous National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), our charge focused on 
DOE’s efforts enterprise-wide, and we refer to these efforts as being undertaken by “DOE” throughout, except 
where we mean to refer solely to NNSA. 
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I.  Setting Objectives and Priorities for DOE Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs 
Findings 
1. DOE’s nonproliferation efforts have made and are making substantial contributions to U.S.
national security.
2. DOE’s nonproliferation programs have undergone several years of substantial budget
reductions, with further reductions proposed for fiscal year (FY) 2015.
3. DOE does not have a risk-informed analysis of priorities to guide its nonproliferation efforts.
4. The U.S. government does not yet have a compelling vision for the future of its
nonproliferation efforts or how DOE’s programs fit in that larger picture, though DOE has
launched an effort to develop one.
5. DOE often does not make the case persuasively for its nonproliferation programs to the White
House, Congress, or the public.
Recommendations 
1. Lay out a vision and set priorities.  DOE and the rest of the U.S. government should
articulate a compelling vision of the nuclear security and nonproliferation future they seek to
achieve.  DOE should then establish a consistent process to develop risk-informed priorities
for its nonproliferation programs, seeking to invest resources wherever they can make the
biggest difference in reducing risk to U.S. and world security.  To facilitate this effort, DOE
should work with other relevant government agencies to develop approaches to assessing
the balance of risks and opportunities and developing a consistent, risk-informed set of
priorities across the nonproliferation enterprise, integrated with the broader U.S.
government nonproliferation effort.
The Task Force anticipates that among the higher priorities would be: (a) maintain the rate of
progress in nuclear security; (b) provide needed technical expertise and options to support
critical nonproliferation and arms control negotiations, such as those with Iran and North
Korea; (c) contribute to reducing the risk that additional countries or groups will acquire key
nuclear weapons-related technologies; (d) strengthen international organizations that help
support important U.S. nuclear priorities, particularly the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system; (e) provide intelligence insight on nuclear threats,
integrating technical and political expertise as DOE laboratories did in the past; and (f)
provide the policy tools needed for the future, including both research and development
(R&D) on new verification and nonproliferation technologies and maintaining the facilities
and expertise needed to address future challenges.
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2. Develop a roadmap for achieving the vision.  DOE should work with the rest of the U.S.
government, preferably through a formal interagency process, to develop a roadmap to
achieve the U.S. government’s vision of the nuclear security and nonproliferation future. This
roadmap should specify milestones, indicators of progress, requirements for funding, and
any needed changes in organizational structure and authorities.
3. Ensure adequate funding to achieve high priority goals. DOE should strive to ensure that
high priority goals, such as maintaining progress in nuclear security, receive adequate
funding.
4. Make the case.  For each program, DOE should explain the threat, what it plans to do, which
risks would be reduced and how the planned programs compare to alternative efforts to
achieve the same goals, what the life-cycle cost would be, and why DOE believes the specific
approach and scope it plans to pursue are the optimal strategy.  In particular, DOE should
consider producing a biannual report to the President and Congress on non-weapons
national security activities, especially non-proliferation, comparable to the report that NNSA
currently produces on the nuclear weapons program.
5. Prepare for the unexpected.  DOE should (a) undertake a study of possible game-changing
surprises and the steps that might need to be taken in response; (b) work with Congress to
establish a contingency fund and contingency capabilities to be used as unexpected
opportunities or requirements arise.
II. Improving DOE Nuclear Policy Integration, Analysis, and Advocacy
Findings 
1. Below the level of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, there is no official or office within the
Department responsible for looking at nuclear policy across the board.
2. DOE’s policy role and voice in the national security interagency process is inconsistent,
sometimes weak, and sometimes absent entirely.
Recommendations 
1. Integrate nuclear policy within DOE.  Integrate responsibility for all aspects of nuclear
policy within a single policy office.  This could measurably strengthen DOE’s role and voice in
the interagency process, and in the USG debate and policymaking related to nuclear policy.
2. Improve DOE’s secure connectivity to the other national security agencies and the White
House by ensuring that it has the equipment and procedures it needs for effective
communications.
3. Strengthen the integration of science and technology expertise into nuclear policymaking.
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III. Strengthening DOE Relationships with Field Offices, National Laboratories,
and Production Facilities
Findings 
1. The relationships among DOE headquarters, field offices, national labs, and production
facilities are inadequate to ensure the health of the national laboratories and to maximize
their contributions to nuclear nonproliferation.
2. A number of advisory groups and commissions currently are exploring ways to improve the
health and management of the labs to support the full range of DOE missions.
Recommendation 
In light of the recommendations of the studies now in progress, DOE should as an urgent 
priority strengthen the relationship among DOE headquarters, field offices, national labs, and 
production facilities.  
IV. Continuing and Revitalizing U.S.-Russian Nuclear Security and
Nonproliferation Cooperation
Findings 
1. DOE’s global work to improve nuclear security has substantially reduced the risk of nuclear
terrorism, but there is more work to do.
2. The deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations resulting from the crisis in Ukraine makes nuclear
security cooperation more challenging.
3. Continuing nuclear security cooperation with Russia remains critical to U.S. national security
interests.
4. Nuclear security cooperation with Russia will not be easy, is likely to encounter delays, and
will require creative approaches and sustained attention.
Recommendations 
1. Continue nuclear security and nonproliferation cooperation with Russia.  DOE should
make every effort to continue its nuclear security cooperation with Russia despite current
tensions with Russia over Ukraine.  Other U.S.-Russian cooperation that serves U.S.
nonproliferation interests should also continue.
2. Plan for different scenarios with Russia.  Given the crisis in Ukraine and heightened
opposition in both the United States and Russia to any approach that smacks of
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“assistance,” DOE should develop plans to further U.S. interests in effective nuclear security 
under a range of scenarios. 
3. Develop a more equal approach in U.S.-Russian nuclear security cooperation. With the era
of large-scale equipment installation nearing its end, DOE should develop concepts for a
new approach to nuclear security cooperation that could be implemented in the scenarios
in which nuclear security cooperation is able to continue.
4. Take a broader approach to consolidating nuclear material in the U.S. and Russia. Political
conditions permitting, DOE and Russia should work together to lay out strategic plans by
which they can each accomplish their defense and civilian missions with the smallest
number of locations with HEU or separated plutonium.
V.  Developing and Implementing an Investment Strategy for Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Research and Development 
Findings 
1. DOE’s nonproliferation R&D program is critically important, and has provided major
improvements in nonproliferation and arms control technologies.
2. DOE’s approach of spreading nonproliferation R&D investment to large numbers of
laboratories in small increments is inhibiting nonproliferation technology innovation within
the labs.
3. DOE’s nonproliferation R&D investments are inadequately coordinated within DOE and with
other USG agencies.
Recommendation 
Formulate and implement a multiagency investment strategy for nuclear nonproliferation 
R&D.  As indicated in the recent Defense Science Board study on “Assessment of Nuclear 
Monitoring and Verification Technologies,” the U.S. government should develop a strategic 
investment strategy for R&D across the USG to create a more effective and efficient R&D 
capability that furthers U.S. national security interests and receives sufficient resources to 
succeed.   
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Introduction 
The SEAB Task Force on Nuclear Nonproliferation (TFNN) was established by the Secretary of Energy 
on December 20, 2013 to “advise the DOE on future areas of emphasis for its nuclear 
nonproliferation activities by addressing the following questions: 
1. What are the current and likely future challenges to nuclear nonproliferation?
2. What should DOE be doing to help the United States Government prepare to meet those
challenges?
3. What are DOE’s current areas of emphasis in nuclear nonproliferation?
4. In what ways should DOE’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts be modified and/or expanded?
5. What obstacles stand in the way of making the recommended changes in DOE’s nuclear
nonproliferation activities, and how might they be overcome?”2
This document represents the interim report of the Task Force. (A more complete report is to be 
submitted at the end of 2014.)  Herein, the Task Force sets forth its findings and recommendations 
to date in five timely and important areas: (I) Setting Objectives and Priorities for DOE Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Programs; (II) Improving DOE Nuclear Policy Integration, Analysis, and Advocacy; 
(III) Strengthening DOE Relationships with Field Offices, National Laboratories, and Production 
Facilities; (IV) Continuing and Revitalizing U.S.-Russian Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation 
Cooperation; and (V) Developing and Implementing an Investment Strategy for Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Research and Development.  The recommendations are mutually reinforcing. 
In addressing the problem of nuclear proliferation, it must be recognized that despite substantial 
recent progress, there are nations pursuing nuclear weapons, there remain nuclear stockpiles that 
are dangerously insecure, and there are terrorists eager to acquire and use nuclear weapons. 
Urgent actions are needed to meet these continuing threats. 
The complete charge to the Task Force and a list of its members appear as Appendices A and B 
respectively. 
2
 In keeping with our charge, we interpret nuclear “nonproliferation” to include the full set of U.S. efforts to 
prevent additional states or substate groups from acquiring nuclear weapons and the technologies and materials 
needed to make them, including efforts that some refer to as counterproliferation, weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) counter-terrorism, or nuclear security.  While most of DOE’s nuclear nonproliferation activities are 
implemented by the semi-autonomous National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), our charge focused on 
DOE’s efforts enterprise-wide, and we refer to these efforts as being undertaken by “DOE” throughout, except 
where we mean to refer solely to NNSA. 
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I.   Setting Objectives and Priorities for DOE Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Programs 
Findings 
1. DOE’s nonproliferation efforts have made and are making substantial contributions to U.S.
national security.
 DOE’s efforts have dramatically improved nuclear security in Russia, the other states of
the former Soviet Union, and a number of countries elsewhere, greatly reducing the risk
that stolen plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) will fall into the hands of
terrorists – though risks remain, as discussed below.
 DOE has helped over 20 countries eliminate all the weapons-usable nuclear material on
their soil, eliminated such material from dozens of additional sites, and converted scores
of research reactors so that they no longer use HEU as fuel.
 DOE has provided crucial technical expertise to support U.S. arms control and
nonproliferation negotiations, and continues to do so – including on critical issues
currently being discussed in negotiations with Iran.
 DOE has helped dozens of countries implement effective export controls on nuclear and
dual-use technologies and helped with interdiction of thousands of dangerous
technology transfers, forming a major part of the U.S. effort to stem black-market
nuclear technology trafficking.
 DOE has provided important technologies, training, and other support for the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), strengthening global safeguards, security,
and safety implementation.
 DOE has developed a wide range of nonproliferation technologies, particularly focused
on verification technologies, some of which are being applied today and some of which
are available to support future negotiations.
 Innovative efforts such as the Cooperative Monitoring Center have helped bring experts
from countries with the potential for regional conflicts together to discuss verification
and confidence-building measures. These ongoing efforts are vital tools for building
relationships and understandings that can help reduce the risk of conflict and increase
the potential for arms restraint.
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2. DOE’s nonproliferation programs have undergone several years of substantial budget
reductions, with further reductions proposed for fiscal year (FY) 2015.
The overall budget for DOE’s nonproliferation programs has declined from over $2.2 billion
in FY 2013 to an FY 2015 request of just under $1.6 billion, a reduction of over 30 percent.
The FY 2015 request proposes to increase DOE’s weapons activities by $544 million while
decreasing its nonproliferation program by $399 million.  Some of the nonproliferation
reductions are the result of projects being completed or efforts being put on hold while DOE
reviews its approach to them – most prominently including the uranium-plutonium mixed
oxide (MOX) project for disposition of excess weapons plutonium, whose projected lifecycle
costs have ballooned to over $30 billion.  In a number of areas, however, including efforts to
improve security for nuclear material around the world, it appears that important
nonproliferation work is being slowed or canceled because of lack of funds.  Overall, DOE’s
nonproliferation budget is now hundreds of millions of dollars a year less than these
programs had been planning for only a few years ago.
3. DOE does not have a risk-informed analysis of priorities to guide its nonproliferation efforts.
The Task Force made a concerted effort to determine DOE’s nonproliferation priorities.
Instead of priorities, we received a “laundry list” of everything DOE was currently doing in
nonproliferation.  These “priorities” are too numerous to provide effective strategic
direction or efficient budgeting, or to enable DOE to build organizational capacity in the
right places with limited resources.  When everything is a priority, nothing is a priority.
Setting clear priorities is always important, but it is all the more important today, when
threats are shifting and budgets are declining.  Priorities make clear what should receive
more attention and resources, and why.  The process of prioritization is also critical,
fostering discipline and efficiency within DOE, deploying the best talent to tackle the most
important issues, bolstering DOE’s role in the interagency process, and enhancing
nonproliferation efforts across the USG.
Each nonproliferation program has developed a set of priorities for its own work.  Many of
these priorities are sensible.  In a number of cases, however, these priorities are
insufficiently risk-informed and differ significantly from one program to another.  For
example, in some cases the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) has devoted millions of
dollars to addressing material for which the Materials Protection and Accounting (MPC&A)
program would not fund security upgrades, because of different judgments about the
security risks posed by impure and modestly radioactive materials.
Priorities for the work of individual programs do not solve the difficult problem of making
choices among different programs.  At present, it appears that priorities are set in
substantial part on the basis of which program managers are most successful at selling their
efforts to DOE leadership, the White House, and the Congress.
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4. The U.S. government does not yet have a compelling vision for the future of its
nonproliferation efforts or for how DOE’s programs fit in that larger picture, though DOE has
launched an effort to develop one.
NNSA’s Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation has made a worthy effort to explore the
challenges and opportunities it will face in the future.  The Task Force sees NNSA’s over-the-
horizon review as a step in the right direction.
What is ultimately needed, however, is a comprehensive and compelling U.S. government
nuclear nonproliferation vision that includes a view or views of the future state of the world
that the U.S. seeks to achieve; a strategic roadmap that lays out the key steps, specific goals,
and organizational, human capital, and budgetary resources needed to achieve success; and
measures and feedback systems to assess progress and make midcourse corrections.
5. DOE often does not adequately make the case for its nonproliferation programs to the White
House, Congress, or the public.
As already noted, DOE’s nonproliferation programs have suffered years of budget
reductions.  DOE is not likely to get increased funding until it can make a stronger case to
the White House and the Congress on the value proposition from its nonproliferation
programs, outlining the risks to U.S. national security that could be reduced with additional
funds and the risks that will likely increase without those funds.
The Task Force heard criticism from White House and Congressional experts that DOE was
often unable to articulate what the effects would be of cutting back or increasing funding
for particular programs by 10-20 percent.  Similarly, they reported that DOE was often
unable to explain how it had decided what the scope of its efforts in a particular area should
be, how much the planned efforts would reduce risk, and what the effect on risk of a
smaller or larger effort would be.  As one example, DOE has not effectively articulated how
much the total risk of nuclear and radiological trafficking would be reduced if it helped
countries install and operate radiation detection systems at all the sites where it plans to do
so, and how that risk reduction would change if the number of sites was decreased or
increased.
Why the Challenges Persist 
We do not yet fully comprehend the factors driving DOE’s difficulty in establishing clear 
priorities for its nonproliferation efforts.  It is clear there are multiple drivers.  The following 
discussion should be considered as preliminary hypotheses. 
First, establishing priorities in this complex area is inherently difficult.  Reasonable people will 
disagree over whether installing security upgrades for a research reactor with a modest stock of 
HEU does more or less to reduce risk than spending the equivalent amount of money training a 
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developing country’s experts to strengthen their ability to detect and stop illicit shipments of 
nuclear technologies, to take one of countless examples.   
Second, no one wants to have their program called out as a lower priority than others – and in 
some quarters, doing so seems likely to serve only to identify places the budget could be cut.  
Not articulating priorities is seen by some as a way to avoid further budget reductions.  
Third, as discussed elsewhere in this report, DOE does not have an office or process with the 
staff and mandate to develop cross-cutting policies concerning the many different areas of 
nuclear technology it handles, from nuclear weapons to nuclear waste.  While recent years have 
seen increased coordination among the senior leaders of efforts on nonproliferation, nuclear 
energy, and nuclear weapons, overall each of these activities largely proceeds in its own 
stovepipe – and within the nonproliferation effort, each individual program is largely operating 
within its own stovepipe as well, attempting to optimize its ability to achieve its own objectives 
with its own resources. 
Fourth, DOE has been subject to the vagaries of shifting priorities determined elsewhere, from 
the Congressional decision to cut off scientist engagement to the White House decision to call a 
pause in Second Line of Defense installations. 
Fifth, the pressures of day-to-day management of programs inherently make it difficult to draw 
back and ask larger questions about priorities and long-term strategies.  In the midst of a battle 
to take a particular hill, it is very difficult to have perspective on how much that hill matters to 
victory in the larger war.  This is one reason why the task of developing cross-cutting priorities is 
likely to require a separate group, not charged with ongoing management of DOE’s 
nonproliferation effort, as discussed elsewhere in this report. 
Recommendations 
1. Lay out a vision and set priorities.  DOE and the rest of the U.S. government should
articulate a compelling vision of the nuclear security and nonproliferation future they seek
to achieve.  DOE should then establish a consistent process to develop risk-informed
priorities for its nonproliferation programs, seeking to invest resources wherever they can
make the biggest difference in reducing risk to U.S. and world security.  To facilitate this
effort, DOE should work with other relevant government agencies to develop approaches to
assessing the balance of risks and opportunities and developing a consistent, risk-informed
set of priorities across the nonproliferation enterprise, integrated with the broader U.S.
government nonproliferation effort.
DOE priorities should be aligned with national priorities, based on both the scale of the risk
to be addressed and the degree of the opportunity for DOE to contribute to reducing it.
There are some large risks, for example, where other agencies are in the lead, and DOE
needs only a modest investment to provide support; there may be other cases where there
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is a substantial risk to be reduced but little near-term opportunity to convince the relevant 
countries to take the action needed to reduce it.  Setting these priorities will require difficult 
judgments among quite disparate types of risks and activities, particularly as some programs 
that seem to offer little near-term risk reduction may lay important foundations for the long 
term. 
The Task Force anticipates that among the higher priorities would be: (a) maintain the rate 
of progress in nuclear security; (b) provide needed technical expertise and options to 
support critical nonproliferation and arms control negotiations, such as those with Iran and 
North Korea; (c) contribute to reducing the risk that additional countries or groups will 
acquire key nuclear weapons-related technologies; (d) strengthen international 
organizations that help support important U.S. nuclear priorities, particularly the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system; (e) provide 
intelligence insight on nuclear threats, integrating technical and political expertise as DOE 
laboratories did in the past; and (f) provide the policy tools needed for the future, including 
both R&D on new verification and nonproliferation technologies and maintaining the 
facilities and expertise needed to address future challenges.  (The Task Force intends to 
include in its more complete, year-end report detailed recommendations on priorities for 
DOE’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts.) 
2. Develop a roadmap for achieving the vision.  DOE should work with the rest of the U.S.
government, preferably through a formal interagency process, to develop a roadmap to
achieve the U.S. government’s vision of the nuclear security and nonproliferation future.
This roadmap should specify milestones, indicators of progress, requirements for funding,
and any needed changes in organizational structure and authorities.
3. Ensure adequate funding to achieve high priority goals. DOE should strive to ensure that
high priority goals, such as maintaining progress in nuclear security, receive adequate
funding.
Given the immense consequences of a nuclear terrorist attack and the modest costs of
nuclear security, the basic U.S. policy should be to provide sufficient funding so that no
effort that shows promise of being able to make a significant and lasting reduction in the
risk of nuclear terrorism will be delayed because money is not available to implement it. The
ongoing shift toward less emphasis on installing equipment and more emphasis on
convincing countries to take action themselves will mean lower spending levels in the future
– but the reduction should not come at a pace that would slow important nuclear security
efforts.  The U.S. government should develop a plan to ensure, as rapidly as practicable, that 
all nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials worldwide are sustainably and 
effectively protected against the full range of plausible adversary threats, and should 
provide the full funding that is needed to implement that plan.  Nuclear security, however, 
should not be thought of as an effort that will be “finished” at a particular moment, but as 
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an objective that will require on ongoing focus on continuous improvement for as long as 
nuclear weapons and materials continue to coexist in the world with terrorists seeking mass 
destruction.  
4. Make the case.  For each program, DOE should explain the threat, explain what it plans to
do, which risks would be reduced and how the planned programs compare to alternative
efforts to achieve the same goals, what the life-cycle cost would be, and why DOE believes
the specific approach and scope it plans to pursue are the optimal strategy.  In particular,
DOE should consider producing a biannual report to the President and Congress on non-
weapons national security activities, especially non-proliferation comparable to the report
that NNSA currently produces on the nuclear weapons program.
5. Prepare for the unexpected.  DOE should (a) undertake a study of possible game-changing
surprises and the steps that might need to be taken in response; (b) work with Congress to
establish a contingency fund and contingency capabilities to be used as unexpected
opportunities or requirements arise.
II. Improving DOE Nuclear Policy Integration, Analysis, and Advocacy
Findings 
1. Below the level of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, there is no official or office within the
Department responsible for looking at nuclear policy across the board.
 DOE’s policies related to the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile are shaped in Defense
Programs; its policies focused on nonproliferation are shaped in Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation; its policies focused on nuclear energy and nuclear waste management
are shaped in the Office of Nuclear Energy (though that is largely a research and
development organization rather than one focused on broader policy issues facing
nuclear energy); its policies with respect to the development of the naval fuel cycle are
developed within Naval Reactors.
 Each of these offices is developing and implementing policies that have effects on each
other.  In the absence of an office where all aspects of nuclear policy are considered
together, decisions and strategies are adopted that may undercut objectives in a
separate sector of nuclear policy.  Yet no current office within the Department (except
for the Secretary’s office) is positioned to integrate and mediate the sometimes
competing interests of the different nuclear programs.
 There are currently two main policy offices within the Department of Energy:  the Office
of International Affairs and the Office of Energy Policy and Systems Analysis.  Neither
office currently has the staff expertise or mandate to handle nuclear policy issues across
the broad set of nuclear issues.
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 Decisions taken with respect to the US nuclear stockpile are often not examined in the
context of nonproliferation policy objectives.  Indeed, they sometimes compete with
U.S. nonproliferation goals. Similarly, efforts in DOE’s nuclear energy program also have
effects on nonproliferation.
2. DOE’s policy role and voice in the national security interagency process is inconsistent,
sometimes weak and sometimes absent entirely.
 Traditionally, DOE has been seen as an also-ran on national security after the “main”
security agencies, National Security Council (NSC), State, Defense, and intelligence.  DOE
is often seen more as an implementing agency than as one with a major role in
developing policies.  But given its role in maintaining the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile,
its broad nonproliferation activities (larger than those of any other agency), the deep
technical expertise of its laboratories and facilities, and the creative ideas that
sometimes originate from those wells of experience and expertise, DOE has the
potential to play a more significant and useful role in the interagency policy process
than it does today.
 The Department of Defense dominates the decision process related to nuclear weapons
requirements and policies.  The Department of State is the dominant interagency voice
on nonproliferation policy.  This is true despite the fact that DOE, among all agencies,
should be uniquely positioned to integrate a wide range of aspects of nuclear policy and
could bring to bear the unparalleled technical expertise of its laboratories.
 The Task Force was told of a number of cases in which DOE played a smaller policy role
than was justified by its engagement in the issue; did not bring its full technical expertise
to the interagency discussion; or offered the view from only one part of DOE rather than
an integrated departmental perspective.
 In some cases, DOE is simply not invited to participate.  For example, DOE was not
represented in Syria chemical weapon (CW) discussions, even though issues such as
arranging secure shipments relate to nuclear work DOE has been doing in many
countries.
Why these challenges persist 
Because DOE lacks a lead office for creating a single coherent and compelling nuclear policy that 
integrates interests from the Department’s nuclear energy, nonproliferation, and nuclear 
weapons programs, DOE’s interests are sometimes represented narrowly in interagency 
security discussions. 
DOE’s fundamental added value to policy discussions comes from the expertise and operational 
capacities of its laboratories.  Yet DOE has limited science and technology (S&T) expertise within 
the policy offices called upon to represent DOE at interagency discussions.  As a result, DOE is 
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not always able to represent and leverage the deep expertise available from the labs within the 
context of interagency discussions.  
One of the key mechanisms for bringing laboratory experts into DOE headquarters has been the 
use of Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) transfers.  This instrumentality is now used 
infrequently, partly because of concerns over conflict of interest.  (One interviewee described 
the IPA process as “broken.”)  In the absence of analysts with strong technical credentials, 
DOE’s policy making is informed primarily by foreign affairs specialists who are not best 
positioned to represent the core strengths of the DOE complex or technical aspects of issues 
related to nuclear policymaking. 
Recommendations 
1. Integrate nuclear policy within DOE.  Integrate responsibility for all aspects of nuclear
policy within a single policy office.  This could measurably strengthen DOE’s role and voice in
the interagency process and in the USG debate and policymaking related to nuclear policy.
While the Task Force unanimously agrees on the need for an integrated policy office, there
are competing views on where that office should be located within the Department.  We
offer the following options for consideration by the Secretary of Energy: (1) merge these
functions into the existing DOE Office of Energy Policy and Systems Analysis; (2) create an
office of nuclear security policy in DOE; or (3) create an office of nuclear security policy in
NNSA.
In examining these options, DOE should consider:
 Whether the current organizational structure of DOE policy offices is effective or
whether a more systemic overhaul is needed.
 How the proposed nuclear policy office will ensure sufficient attention to longer-term
thinking and planning.
 What are the most appropriate and effective counterpart offices in relevant USG
agencies to maximize interagency coordination and collaboration.
 What key levers will enhance prospects for success of the policy office. These include
providing appropriate professional incentives to attract top staff, fostering a culture that
values effective policy and planning, selecting the right leadership, and communicating
the importance of the office to DOE’s mission.
2. Improve DOE’s secure connectivity to the other national security agencies and the White
House by ensuring that it has the equipment and procedures it needs for effective
communications.
3. Strengthen the integration of science and technology expertise into nuclear policymaking.
 Examples of mechanisms by which this integration might be accomplished include:
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o Recruiting regular technical talent from the labs through the Intergovernmental
Personnel Act (IPA) mobility program on rotating two to three year assignments.
o Creating a senior technical advisor or “Science Council” of several advisors within
both the Office of Defense Nonproliferation and the newly established Integrated
Policy Office.  These advisors would serve in full-time positions and report directly to
the head of those offices.
o Establishing standing advisory committees to provide independent review and
advice to the same key offices on a regular basis.
III. Strengthening DOE Relationships with Field Offices, National
Laboratories, and Production Facilities
Findings 
1. The relationships among DOE headquarters, field offices, national labs, and production
facilities are inadequate to ensure the health of the national laboratories and to maximize
their contributions to nuclear nonproliferation.
2. A number of advisory groups and commissions currently are exploring ways to improve the
health and management of the labs to support the full range of DOE missions.
Why these findings matter 
A robust, technically strong, and well managed DOE laboratory system is vital to achieving many 
of the non-proliferation objectives discussed in this report.  The laboratories provide crucial 
technical support to all agencies involved in formulating U.S. national security missions, 
including nonproliferation policy and executing nonproliferation programs.  Given the dynamic 
nature of the threat environment, it is essential that the national labs maintain the human 
capital, budgetary resources, and organization necessary to continue developing innovative 
capabilities and maintain the technical expertise required for their national security missions.  
All initiatives that are considered to improve the relationship among the elements of the 
DOE/NNSA system should devote special attention to assure that nonproliferation and other 
national security requirements are met as well as the requirements of the weapons research 
development test and evaluation (RDT&E) program.  Although specific recommendations and 
analyses lie outside the scope of this report it is clear that a healthy lab system consists of three 
key components: a top-flight work force of experts who are technically knowledgeable about 
nuclear activities around the world; sufficient budgetary resources for capabilities to address 
priorities; and a management system that ensures this technological expertise is effectively and 
efficiently utilized by all relevant elements of the U.S. government. 
C-18 
Recommendation 
In light of the recommendations of the studies now in progress, DOE should as an urgent 
priority strengthen the relationship among DOE headquarters, field offices, national labs, and 
production facilities.  
IV. Continuing and Revitalizing U.S.-Russian Nuclear Security and
Nonproliferation Cooperation 
Findings 
1. DOE’s global work to improve nuclear security has substantially reduced the risk of nuclear
terrorism, but there is more work to do.
Terrorists cannot make a nuclear bomb if they cannot get the needed nuclear material.
Securing and accounting for nuclear material – or removing it entirely from sites around the
world – are critical steps to reduce the danger of nuclear terrorism.  DOE’s work with Russia,
the other states of the former Soviet Union, countries in South Asia, China, and other
countries around the world have reduced major risks to U.S. security.  Substantial risks
remain in countries around the world, however, that must be addressed.
2. The deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations resulting from the crisis in Ukraine makes nuclear
security cooperation more challenging.
In both Washington and Moscow, the political context for cooperation has completely
changed. In both capitals, hostility is running very high and many cooperative efforts have
been cut off or put on hold.  While neither Russia nor the United States has yet cut off
nuclear security cooperation, both houses of the U.S. Congress have passed legislation
calling for such cooperation to be cut off, and the Russian government has been moving
slowly on some important efforts.3  Russia’s actions in Ukraine are unacceptable and require
a firm response – but the U.S. retains a vital interest in ensuring that Russian nuclear
stockpiles are effectively and sustainably secured.  The United States has the same vital
interest in other countries – and a variety of political difficulties are inhibiting nuclear
security cooperation elsewhere as well.  But it is in Russia that the situation has
fundamentally changed; hence, the Task Force has chosen to focus on nuclear security
cooperation with Russia in this interim report.
3 In general, this legislation would prohibit DOE cooperation, including nuclear security cooperation, 
unless the administration certified that certain conditions were met.  Congress has not yet developed 
the final version of the certification requirements, which would determine whether the legislation really 
slowed or stopped this cooperation or not.  
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3. Continuing nuclear security cooperation with Russia remains critical to U.S. national security
interests.
Two decades of nuclear security cooperation with Russia have resulted in tremendous
improvements in security and accounting for Russia’s vast stockpiles of nuclear weapons
and materials.  The risk of nuclear theft has been greatly reduced.  But the job is not done.
Russia continues to have the world’s largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons, separated
plutonium, and highly enriched uranium (HEU), in the world’s largest number of buildings
and bunkers – and a variety of vulnerabilities remain that a sophisticated conspiracy could
exploit.
Russia and the United States have the world’s largest nuclear stockpiles and nuclear
complexes, and the world’s largest reservoirs of experience in providing security and
accounting for nuclear weapons and the materials needed to make them.  They bear a
special responsibility for nuclear security, as the U.S. and Russian presidents have
repeatedly agreed.  Effective nuclear security for all stockpiles worldwide will be almost
impossible to achieve without Russia and the United States working together – on
improving and sustaining nuclear security in their own countries, helping other countries
improve their nuclear security, and strengthening the global nuclear security framework.
Just as the United States cooperated with the Soviet Union to build the global
nonproliferation regime even when the two countries were locked in a global cold war, the
United States must seek ways to cooperate with today’s Russia where doing so serves U.S.
national interests.
DOE’s efforts in nuclear security are an investment in U.S. security, not a favor to Russia.
Indeed, much of the Russian government is unenthusiastic about this cooperation, seeing it
as unwanted American intrusion into Russian nuclear secrets.
4. Nuclear security cooperation with Russia will not be easy, is likely to encounter delays, and
will require creative approaches and sustained attention.
As noted earlier, this cooperation is already encountering rocky political waters in both
capitals.  In the lead-up to the expiration of the Nunn-Lugar umbrella agreement in mid-
2013, cooperation virtually ground to a halt as Russian officials waited to see what would
happen.  Even since the follow-on agreement was completed, providing a firm legal
foundation for nuclear security cooperation, Russian officials have been slow to move
forward.  Although leaders at many nuclear sites remain eager for continued cooperation
with the United States, these efforts have lost the popularity they once had in Washington
and Moscow.
Even if it survives the current political crisis, U.S.-Russian nuclear security cooperation is
entering a new phase that will require new approaches.  The phase that was focused on
major equipment installations and construction of new security systems is nearing its end.
The future will be much more focused on sustaining and improving what has been put in
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place, including effective regulation, sharing best practices, strengthening security culture, 
and building sustainability.  It will be reducing U.S. investments coupled with efforts to 
motivate Russia to take additional steps on its own.  And it may be focused on working 
together to help other states improve their nuclear security.  This different focus of nuclear 
security work will cost less, but it will require different approaches, including a shift away 
from a donor-recipient approach to a more equal approach, with resources and ideas 
coming from both sides.  Achieving that will not be easy. 
There is a legitimate question as to why Russia should not be paying for its nuclear security 
itself, more than two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and with a Russian 
budget deficit far smaller than the U.S. budget deficit.  But at present Russia is not making 
the needed investments in nuclear security areas the United States views as critical, or 
putting in place a regulatory structure as strong as the U.S. government believes is 
necessary.  The work of securing these stockpiles will not get done to the standards 
necessary unless the United States continues to invest – while simultaneously working 
aggressively to persuade the Russian government to increase its own investment and 
strengthen its own rules. 
Recommendations 
1. Continue nuclear security and nonproliferation cooperation with Russia.  DOE should
make every effort to continue its nuclear security cooperation with Russia despite current
tensions with Russia over Ukraine.  Other U.S.-Russian cooperation that serves U.S.
nonproliferation interests should also continue.
2. Plan for different scenarios with Russia.  Given the crisis in Ukraine and heightened
opposition in both the United States and Russia to any approach that smacks of
“assistance,” DOE should develop plans to further U.S. interests in effective nuclear security
under a range of scenarios.
These scenarios should include:
 A positive scenario in which the crisis over Ukraine is resolved and the United States and
Russia return to relations that permit a range of cooperative work;
 A scenario in which the crisis continues but nuclear security cooperation is able to
continue;
 A scenario in which the crisis continues and only very limited nuclear security
cooperation is possible; and
 A scenario in which nuclear security cooperation with Russia becomes impossible.
For each of these scenarios, DOE should prepare a plan for the activities to be pursued, the 
tactics and approaches to be used, and the budget allocations required to support the work. 
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For now, DOE should budget for a significant level of continuing nuclear security work in 
Russia – but should also prepare plans for other uses of those funds if these efforts are 
greatly constrained or delayed. 
3. Develop a more equal approach in U.S.-Russian nuclear security cooperation.  With the
era of large-scale equipment installation nearing its end, DOE should develop concepts for a
new approach to nuclear security cooperation that could be implemented in the scenarios
in which nuclear security cooperation is able to continue. Both Russia and the United States
continue to face serious nuclear security challenges. Both can benefit from learning from
sharing experience and best practices. Hence, if the political situation makes it possible,
Russia and the United States should undertake an ongoing, long-term nuclear security
cooperation effort, focused on helping other countries improve their nuclear security and
on exchanging ideas, visits, and technologies to make further improvements in their own
nuclear security arrangements.
4. Take a broader approach to consolidating nuclear material in the U.S. and Russia.  Russia
has a vastly outsized infrastructure of buildings and bunkers with weapons-usable nuclear
material, the largest in the world.  The United States has greatly consolidated its own
holdings of weapons and materials in the last two decades, driven in part by the high costs
of meeting post-9/11 nuclear security requirements for each site where potential nuclear
bomb materials exist.  This effort has resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars a year in
annual security savings.  While Russia has consolidated its complex as well, with some help
from DOE, it has not gone as far.
Political conditions permitting, DOE should undertake a much broader discussion with
Russia about consolidation.  DOE and Russia should work together to lay out strategic plans
by which they can each accomplish their defense and civilian missions with the smallest
number of locations with HEU or separated plutonium.
V.  Developing and Implementing an Investment Strategy for Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Research and Development 
Findings 
1. DOE’s nonproliferation R&D program is critically important, and has provided major
improvements in nonproliferation and arms control technologies.
DOE’s nuclear nonproliferation program, based primarily in its multiple laboratories,
provides the core science and technology needed for new and improved devices, detectors,
and protocols.  More than 75% of the program’s budget is allocated to the laboratories for
R&D and for execution of U.S. government nonproliferation efforts at home and abroad.
DOE’s contributions to U.S. nonproliferation efforts stem largely from its ability to engage
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the nation’s leading experts, including those working on the problems of chemical and 
biological weapons proliferation, in nuclear nonproliferation activities.  Accordingly, DOE 
and the U.S. government as a whole have a fundamental interest in ensuring the health and 
vitality of the DOE laboratories.  Yet the Task Force consistently heard concerns from 
laboratory officials and others that the Department’s management of the enterprise often 
impedes scientific and technical progress. 
2. DOE’s approach of spreading nonproliferation R&D investment to large numbers of
laboratories in small increments is inhibiting nonproliferation technology innovation within
the labs.
In particular, concerns were raised about the absence of a strategic approach to R&D
investments and that the system for managing R&D across the enterprise is smothering
innovation.  For example, DOE’s nonproliferation R&D program has evolved to a program
that is spreading small amounts of funding across more than a dozen laboratories and
facilities.  In fact, as a regular practice, the only source of funding for breakthrough
innovations in the labs is coming not from projects initiated by the Department, but from
laboratory directed R&D (LDRD). The current management system rewards exquisite, tightly
controlled project management instead of technology innovation, which is inherently
riskier.
3. DOE’s nonproliferation R&D investments are inadequately coordinated within DOE and with
other USG agencies.
There is also inadequate coordination between DOE and other USG agencies (in particular
the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) R&D programs), and only modest incentives
to integrate the effort in a broader national R&D strategy.  As a result, the technical
outcomes and abilities of the labs are being diluted and there is no integrated, innovative
R&D program across the whole of government.  A serious look at performers and priorities
is required to avoid inappropriate adjustments to programs and priorities going forward.
Why these challenges matter and persist 
The present DOE nonproliferation R&D program appears balkanized.  Resources are spread 
across all the DOE labs, not just the weapons labs.  This is appropriate to access capabilities not 
strongly or essentially demonstrated in the weapons labs (e.g., new fuel element design) or to 
access unique capabilities developed by other agencies at particular labs (e.g., the DoD 
investments at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory), but it is not credible that eight or 
nine labs actually have essential or unique capabilities in all areas.  DOE should strive for a 
program with fewer but appropriate performers who are maintained at a level above critical 
mass.  
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DOE is the principal developer of technical tools for verification and monitoring and is usually 
the demonstrator of them to at least prototype status as part of developing deployment and 
operational plans.  The Department of State at the policy end of the problem and DoD/DTRA 
and Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) with 
fielding and operational roles abroad and domestically must be properly coupled to the 
assessment of risk and opportunity if DOE’s R&D programs are to provide the highest value per 
dollar invested. 
Recommendation 
Formulate and implement a multiagency investment strategy for nuclear nonproliferation 
R&D.  As indicated in the recent Defense Science Board study on “Assessment of Nuclear 
Monitoring and Verification Technologies,” the U.S. government should develop a strategic 
investment strategy for R&D across the USG to create a more effective and efficient R&D 
capability that furthers U.S. national security interests and receives sufficient resources to 
succeed.   
A logical structure for the strategy is to identify the components of the tasks to be performed, 
the special operating competencies of each of the organizations identified above, and their R&D 
activities in support of each task.  A past successful model for such coordination, albeit on a 
much smaller scale, is the way in which DOE/NNSA, DTRA, DHS, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and the Intel community assessed and coordinated their activities in an 
integrated post-detonation nuclear forensics program.  This coordination has involved not just 
the R&D components of the program, but also those operational components that are stressed 
and tested in realistic exercises. 
